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Graebner, Norman A.
The Germany's sudden acquisition of continental dominance required some adjustment of attitudes and roles in regional politics, especially in Britain and France. Such needed adjustments were not impossible. Germany's dominance did not rest on conquest, although Germany annexed France's AlsaceLorraine along the German border in the 1871 treaty that ended the war. Germany's dominance was largely endemic, resting on its location, size, resources, industries, and the qualities of its large population. None of these assets was based on conquest. The issue of 1871 was whether Europe would willingly coexist with these realities or seek to eliminate them with warwhich was impossible.
Recognizing the insecurities that Germany's unification created, German Chancellor Prince Otto von Bismarck sought, with considerable success, to assure Europe that Germany did not threaten the established interests of the European states. Bismarck understood that the immediate danger for Europe's peace lay in Austro-Russian rivalry. To control these two rivals, Bismarck brought them into the Three Emperors' League. Such levels of statesmanship established the new Germany as a valuable member of Europe's international structure. That statesmanship evaporated suddenly in 1890 when the German Preface x Kaiser, Wilhelm II, dismissed Bismarck, terminated the Three Emperors' League, established an alliance with Austria, and cast Russia adrift. France, diplomatically isolated and determined to regain Alsace-Lorraine, quickly negotiated an alliance with discarded Russia. This divided Europe into two heavily armed alliance systems -with Britain joining France -that sought in 1914 to settle Europe's burgeoning rivalries with war.
At the Great War's end in 1918, Germany, although defeated, remained Europe's most powerful nation. Because of the extreme wartime hatreds, the Allied powers barred Germany from sending a delegation to the Paris Conference of 1919. Without a voice in the Paris deliberations, German leaders rejected the Versailles Treaty, with its territorial and military impositions, and signed it only under duress. Sustaining the Paris decisions against German (and Japanese) opposition required the perpetuation of the alliance that had produced them. President Woodrow Wilson discounted this requirement through his advocacy of collective security, as embodied in the new League of Nations. This eliminated, for the victors, the necessity and responsibility for sustaining the provisions of the Versailles Treaty. Critics warned at the outset that collective security would never function unless the League, in any crisis, had the power to coerce collective action.
In the absence of that power, the League stood helpless when Hitler, after 1933, unleashed his long successful assault on the military and territorial provisions of the Versailles Treaty. Franklin Roosevelt's Washington, supported by the other Allied victors, discovered the defense of the Versailles territorial provisions in the status quo doctrines of non-recognition and peaceful change. Unfortunately, such defenses of the Versailles arrangements proved ineffective. Eventually, Hitler, along with Italy and Japan, gained their territorial objectives in China and Western, Central, and Eastern Europe, leaving the victors with the unappetizing choice of the total disintegration of the Versailles order or war. On the unresolved issue of Danzig and Hitler's assault on Poland in September 1939, Britain and France, having refused repeatedly to defend the Versailles Treaty, chose war rather than further retreat. It was a futile gesture. The victors at Versailles had over-reached. Now they, along with the un defended victims of Nazi aggression, would pay the price.
Norman A. Graebner, who received his Ph.D. degree from the University of Chicago, was persuaded to take a realist view of foreign policy partly through the writings of Hans Morgenthau. Edward M. Bennett was a Graebner student at the University of Illinois, Urbana, who absorbed the same realist perspective in the classes and seminars of Professor Graebner. That viewpoint followed the simple formula for effective foreign policy presented by Professor Morgenthau -success rests on a balance between commitments and power, and between power and diplomacy, and if either is out of balance, failure of policy will follow.
Both authors came to see that Woodrow Wilson failed to understand these requirements for effective foreign policy, and that it was his overweening
